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## ON THE GENUINE QUEERNESS OF MORAL PROPERTIES AND FACTS

Richard T. Garner

John Mackie described a 'second order moral view' as a 'view about the status of moral values and the nature of moral valuing, about where and how they fit into the world'.<sup>1</sup> He called his own second order moral view by two different names, 'moral subjectivism' and 'moral skepticism', but a less misleading designation might be 'anti-realism'.<sup>2</sup> In contrast to non-cognitivists, Mackie claimed that moral judgments have a truth-value, and in contrast to moral realists and ethical naturalists, he held that each and every one of them is false. Moral judgments are false because they all involve the mistaken claim, or assumption, or presupposition, that there are objectively prescriptive moral properties or facts. The two arguments Mackie deployed to support this anti-realism, the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness, have been widely criticised, but I want to show that, when properly understood, they remain troublesome for moral realists.

I begin with some remarks about objective prescriptivity, because that is where the queerness of moral properties and facts is located. Then, I turn briefly to the argument from relativity, and at greater length to the argument from queerness. I defend clarified versions of both arguments against attacks by David Brink, and I show how Brink fails to confront the strongest version of the argument from queerness. He thinks that the real queerness lies in the power of moral judgments to motivate, and so he hopes to avoid queerness by moving to what he calls *externalist moral realism*. While properties that are intrinsically motivating would indeed be queer, queerness of a different magnitude would belong to any property or fact that by itself *called for* humans to act one way rather than another. Even the most vile of poisons does not say 'Don't drink me'. The genuine queerness of moral properties and facts, I shall claim, resides not, or not only, in their alleged power to motivate, but in their alleged intrinsic imperativeness. It is this action-guiding or action-directing (rather than action-causing) feature that Mackie sometimes, but not always, has in mind when he speaks of objective prescriptivity.

<sup>1</sup> J. L. Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 16. Further references to this book will be given in parentheses in the text.

<sup>2</sup> That is, 'anti-(moral) realism'. 'Subjectivism' and 'moral skepticism' are misleading because they have more familiar interpretations that differ from the position Mackie adopts. 'Moral realism' is now widely used to refer to a belief in moral facts.

1. *Objective prescriptivity*: According to Mackie, it is a doctrine of Western moral theory and a dogma of common belief that moral values are objective, not subjective, and that moral judgments are 'partly prescriptive or directive or action-guiding'. (p. 23) Morality is seen as having authority over us—its principles and rules are believed to be objective requirements, not ones we invent, imagine, or impose upon one another, and not ones we can avoid.

Mackie is not alone in identifying this cluster of puzzling beliefs as central to morality. Philippa Foot, commenting on Kant's idea that reason 'commands what ought to happen', identified *inescapability* as the mark of the categorical imperative. 'People talk about the "binding force" of morality', she said, 'but it is not clear what this means if not that we *feel* ourselves unable to escape'.<sup>3</sup> Bernard Williams rejects what he calls the 'morality system' and, like Foot, sees inescapability as a fundamental feature of moral obligation. He says that this inescapability means that there is no opting out of morality, and he identifies *this* idea with Kant's claim that morality is categorical.<sup>4</sup>

Foot notes one way in which morality and etiquette are both inescapable—in societies where rules of morality and etiquette are in force, 'behaviour does not cease to offend against either morality or etiquette because the agent is indifferent to their purposes and to the disapproval he will incur by flouting them'.<sup>5</sup> That is, our own indifference to the imperatives of etiquette (Don't eat peas with a knife!) and to the imperatives of morality (Don't use people for selfish ends!) does not mean that our actions will not offend against the respective systems. But it is one thing for my behaviour to *offend against* a code (of etiquette or of morality), another thing for me to *feel bound* by that code, and yet a third thing for there to be some fact or circumstance beyond (or about) the code itself that *requires* me to obey the code, even if I desire and choose not to. We can escape the imperatives of etiquette by moving into a box on the street, but not even in a box on the street are we free of the imperatives of morality. Moral bondage, unlike the bondage that morality and etiquette share, is non-relative, non-derivative, and inescapable in some special and serious way.

It is clear why moralists claim that the judgments of morality are inescapable, but not at all clear what that claim means. Foot explores several ways of expressing the 'fugitive thought' that morality strongly binds us, that there are things we *must do*, or *have to do*. But she finds nothing standing behind the words, and concludes that there may not be such a form of bondage, and that our belief that there is results from our education and

<sup>3</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), p. 20; Philippa Foot, 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives', in *Virtues and Vices* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 162.

<sup>4</sup> Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 177-178. Examples of the idea that this sort of bondage is central to morality are endless, but to cite one more example for the record, there is Alan Donagan's claim that 'the theory of morality is a theory of a system of laws or precepts binding upon rational creatures as such'. *The Theory of Morality* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977), p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Foot, op. cit., p. 162.

our training. 'Perhaps,' she suggests, 'it makes no sense to say that we "have to" submit to the moral law, or that morality is "inescapable" in some special way'.<sup>6</sup>

Even though the meaning of 'moral bondage' is unclear, the thought that we are inescapably bound is an indispensable part of the institution of morality, as it is understood by those who seriously participate in it. Herein, according to Mackie, lies the common failure of naturalist and non-cognitivist analyses of moral language. Both fail to capture or explain the apparent authority of ethics—naturalists by excluding 'the categorically imperative aspect' (the prescriptivity) and non-cognitivists by excluding 'the claim to objective validity or truth'. (p. 33) Whether it is possible to combine these elements or not, our use of moral concepts requires the presence of both. If moral facts were neutral, then moral judgments would be *objective without being prescriptive*. They would make no demands and require nothing from us, but would merely express the information that an action belongs to the class of right or wrong actions. Learning that something is wrong would be like learning what time it is—its relevance would depend on other commitments. If, on the other hand, moral facts derive their value from subjective sources, then the commands of morality would be *prescriptive without being objective*. They would be expressions of what others want or demand, and while they may influence us, they would have no authority we have not given them.

2. *The error theory*: 'Ordinary moral judgments', says Mackie, 'include a claim to objectivity, an assumption that there are objective values'. (p. 35) People who use ordinary moral judgments may not comprehend what this assumption involves, or how peculiar it is, nevertheless that is what they assume, and Mackie thinks that they are wrong every time. Obligations exist, but they are hypothetical and institutional. We value things, but not because we have discovered anything so peculiar as intrinsic value in them, and not because they meet intrinsic requirements. No matter how bound we feel, and no matter how bound others want us to be, we invent objective prescriptivity and intrinsic value and project them onto perfectly natural and intrinsically neutral items. The error pointed to in the 'error theory' is the error we make when we take our projections for independent features of what we are evaluating, or see our requirements, or the requirements of others, as lodged in reality itself. This error is made by all serious users of moral language; and even those who use it without making the error imply (to others) that they believe in objectively prescriptive moral facts or intrinsically evaluative properties.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 163.

<sup>7</sup> Mackie says that if morality were not seen as objectively prescriptive, it would not be able to perform its function, which is to counteract impulses resulting from limited resources, information, intelligence, rationality, and sympathies. (*Ethics*, p. 108) An *error* theory, by the way, is not necessarily a *falsity* theory. It is easy enough to propose some coherentist or intersubjectivist account of 'truth' that allows us to say that moral judgments are sometimes true, even if those who make them imply something that we must admit is an error.

The idea that users of moral language are uniformly mistaken about the objectivity of morality (or about anything else) does go against ingrained assumptions and common sense. Mackie grants this and concedes that his form of anti-realism needs 'very solid support', much of which he finds in the arguments from relativity and queerness. I will deal briefly with the argument from relativity in the next section. The remaining sections will be devoted to the argument from queerness and related matters.

3. *The argument from relativity (or disagreement)*: Mackie offers the argument from relativity as an argument from moral diversity to the best explanation of that diversity. 'The actual variations in the moral codes', he says, 'are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values'. (p. 37) In 'Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness', David Brink acknowledges that this argument (which he calls the 'argument from disagreement') is an argument to the best explanation, but then he criticizes it as if it were a syllogism with a blatantly false premise. He says that Mackie 'argues that if moral realism were true, all moral disputes should be resolvable, and since many seem irresolvable, he concludes that moral realism is false'.<sup>8</sup> I can't find this terrible argument in Mackie's book, and if I could, I would ignore it in deference to the fact that he more than once insists that 'it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values'. (p. 36)<sup>9</sup>

Moral realism could be true even if some moral disputes were not resolvable, and anti-realism could be true even if everyone agreed about what is right and wrong. As things stand, there is moral disagreement *and* agreement, both within and among cultures, and Mackie's argument from 'disagreement' says that the best explanation of both the agreement and the disagreement is in terms of human feelings, needs, interests, and traditions. Morality (with its claim to objective prescriptivity) enters the picture to limit egoism and to promote desired traits. We get agreement about morality and we have strong moral intuitions because we have learned our lessons, and we get disagreement because we haven't all learned the same lessons, and because our interests often conflict.

If we want to support anti-realism in morality and realism regarding the objects of everyday life and science, we dare not argue from bare disagreement, which occurs everywhere. We must look at the agreement and disagreement in the three areas, and then argue that the cases are different

<sup>8</sup> David O. Brink, 'Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 62 (1984), p. 117.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas Nagel is attacking the same lame syllogism when he claims to find the popularity of the argument from disagreement surprising, and says that radical disagreement 'is a poor reason to conclude that values have no objective reality'. See *The View from Nowhere* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 147-148. But then he turns around and uses an argument from *agreement* to support the objectivity of morality. (p. 148) The arguments, of course, neutralize each other, since there is both agreement and disagreement, and no serious way to say which we have more of.

and that the best overall explanation of the actual patterns of agreement and disagreement leads to anti-realism about goodness and to realism about tables and quarks. When we try to say more about this difference, however, we are forced to confront the claim that moral facts and properties are unique, and this leads directly to the next argument, the argument from queerness.

4. *The argument from queerness*: Mackie divides the argument from queerness into a metaphysical and an epistemological part. The metaphysical part says that objective values would have to be 'entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe', and the epistemological part says that our awareness of these strange qualities 'would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. (p. 38) This argument is impressive when used against the wilder claims of some intuitionists.<sup>10</sup> If moral disagreement is disagreement about properties that are *really there*, then we do need to say something about them and about our apprehension of them. We learned our colour words in front of observable coloured objects, and properties like yellow are integrated into a network of beliefs about the relation of colour to light, paint, perception, physiology, prisms, and photography. Intrinsic values and moral obligations don't fit into any system like this. We have no duty receptors or instruments to detect the presence of trace amounts of intrinsic value. So, the argument from queerness seems well-placed when directed against old-fashioned intuitionists like Moore or Richard Price, who think (or speak as if they think) that moral properties are there in the object itself.

Even without the queerness imported by objective prescriptivity, moral properties would present us with serious metaphysical and epistemological problems. But when we remember that a moral property is not inert, but 'involves a call for action or for the refraining from action', the queerness is compounded. (p. 33) How could *any* feature of something outside us make it the case that we are objectively required to do something? It is not just that we don't need moral properties and facts to explain our moral experience, their queerness would undermine any explanation of moral experience that appealed to them.

5. *Internalism, externalism and moral realism*: Brink's reply to the argument from queerness is based on his version of a distinction between *internalism* and *externalism*. He says that 'in claiming that moral facts would have to

<sup>10</sup> Warnock uses it when he complains that intuitionism 'leaves it, at best, unclear how pieces of moral information are related to any other features of the world, and rather more than unclear how their truth can be established or confirmed'. See G. J. Warnock, *Contemporary Moral Philosophy* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1967), p. 15. More recently, David B. Wong has directed an epistemological version of the argument against neo-intuitionists like Mark Platts, John McDowell, and Alan Donagan. He says that 'there is no persuasive argument for the claim that we interact with moral properties and no explanation of the relation between ourselves and moral properties, in virtue of which we perceive them'. See David B. Wong, *Moral Relativity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 103-104.

be objectively prescriptive, Mackie is claiming that moral realism requires the truth of *internalism*, which is the a priori thesis that 'the recognition of moral facts itself either necessarily motivates or necessarily provides reasons for action'.<sup>11</sup> Historically, internalism has been a view about motivation. William Frankena characterized it as the belief that motivation is somehow 'built into' judgments of moral obligation. One who rejects this belief is an externalist. Externalists believe that one can 'recognize that one has [a moral obligation] and yet have no motivation to perform the required act'.<sup>12</sup> For the internalist, moral judgments state moral facts, and moral facts by themselves motivate those who are aware of them. The strongest form of internalism would say, for example, that when we see some course of action as a duty, we will choose it. Weaker forms say that we are inclined (a lot or a little) to choose what we identify as right, and to prefer what we acknowledge to be good.

Internalism offers us a thesis about motivation, but one that is both ambiguous and easy to criticise. This leads Brink to suggest that the moral realist abandon internalism and adopt externalism.<sup>13</sup> According to the externalist moral realist, motivation comes from the world (by way of desires, sanctions, and training) rather than from moral properties and facts themselves.

6. *The genuine queerness*: Unfortunately for the moral realist, the queerness of being a property that is intrinsically motivating is not the only, or even the major, queerness moral facts exhibit. Another source of queerness emerges when we attend to the other half of Brink's formulation of internalism. In addition to 'motivational internalism', there is also what he calls 'reasons internalism', the thesis that 'it is a priori that the recognition of moral facts itself necessarily provides the agent with reasons to perform the moral action'.<sup>14</sup> Now the situation becomes more complicated due to a distinction, stressed by Frankena, between 'exciting reasons' and 'justifying reasons'.<sup>15</sup> If we are thinking of exciting reasons, then reasons internalism collapses into motivational internalism. But if we understand 'reasons' to mean 'justifying reasons', we are in a different dimension. It is hard to deny that the recognition of a moral fact (say the wrongness of an action), if such a thing were possible, would give us a justifying reason for refraining from performing that action. Recognizing such a moral fact, or even mistakenly believing that we recognize it, we would *have* such a reason, whether we were motivated by it or not.

Moral realists need not be saddled with motivational internalism, but they may have to embrace reasons internalism when 'reason' means 'justifying

<sup>11</sup> Brink, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>12</sup> William K. Frankena, 'Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy', in Kenneth E. Goodpaster (ed.), *Perspectives on Morality* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), p. 50.

<sup>13</sup> Brink, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>15</sup> Frankena, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

reason'. If we recognize a moral fact, then we recognize it *as* a moral fact, which is to say that we recognize it as directing us to be or act one way rather than another—and we recognize this whether or not we are moved to obey the directions. It is the peculiar combination of objectivity and prescriptivity, rather than any intrinsic motivational power, that makes moral facts and properties queer, and neither Brink nor anyone else can purge *that* from them to protect them from the argument from queerness.

Moral realists who acknowledge that moral facts are unique in possessing objective prescriptivity, often deny that this counts against them. Moral facts are not physical facts, they say, they are moral facts, different from other facts in just the way the anti-realist points out—they bind us objectively. They are indeed unusual, even queer, when we compare them to straightforward facts about observable features of objects, but why, the moral realist asks, should this count against them? There are, after all, many unusual things in the world.

It is not easy to know how seriously to take this defence. Moral facts are not just unusual in the way that facts about quarks and black holes are unusual, they are unusual in an unusual way—they demand. If a moral fact obtains, then we have a duty or a right to do something, which is to say that there is a legitimate and justifiable directive that *applies to* us, a directive that we can ignore or disobey, but one from which we cannot escape. The anti-realist says that this demand, however strongly felt, is no more than a projection of demands people make upon one another. The moral realist says that *this* is not enough, that the demands are in some sense independent of our moral feelings and beliefs, and responsible for them.

It is hard to believe in objective prescriptivity because it is hard to make sense of a demand without a demander, and hard to find a place for demands or demanders apart from human interests and conventions. We know what it is for our friends, our job, and our projects to make demands on us, but we do not know what it is for *reality* to do so. A black hole swallows everything, but it demands nothing. The only way to make sense of the demands of morality may be to see morality as a conventional social device, and its demands as ones we ourselves make.<sup>16</sup>

7. *Mackie's share of the blame*: Brink's criticism of Mackie's use of the argument from queerness is not completely unwarranted. When explaining what it is for values to be both prescriptive and objective, Mackie alluded to Plato's Forms, and remarked that *seeing* them 'will not merely tell men what to do but will ensure that they do it, overruling any contrary inclinations'. (pp. 23-24) This is certainly motivational internalism of the strongest sort,

<sup>16</sup> It was perhaps the realization that the world of the naturalist provided no binding obligation and no intrinsic value that led some moralists to adopt theological voluntarism, in the mistaken belief that only a divine being has what it takes to supply the objective prescriptivity that is missing from the natural world. See Elizabeth Anscombe's well-known paper, 'Modern Moral Philosophy', in Anscombe, *Ethics, Religion and Politics* (Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota Press, 1981).

but independent moral facts with less power than that might still be held to be queer. Perhaps moral facts with *any* degree of intrinsic motivational power would be queer as well—the difference between a compulsion and a nudge may be only quantitative. This is why the only course for the externalist moral realist is to deny that moral properties and facts have *any* intrinsic motivational power.

Mackie describes the objective values that are the targets of his arguments as ‘action-guiding’ or ‘action-directing’—but each of these expressions is ambiguous between motivational internalism and reasons internalism. By raising the possibility of externalist moral realism, Brink makes it clear that the important thing about moral facts and properties is that they are advanced as facts and properties that ought to move us. Morality has authority, and authority demands obedience, even if it doesn’t always get it. If Mackie had concentrated more on the alleged authority of morality than on its alleged power, he would have fixed on a kind of queerness that remains even when we abandon motivational internalism. Since he did not, he left the way open for Brink to defend moral realism against the argument from queerness by assuming that the only queer thing about moral facts is their intrinsic power.

8. *Yet another source of queerness:* Ethical naturalism can be seen as one response to the argument from queerness. If moral properties can be identified with natural properties, the naturalist thinks, then there will be no queerness, since natural properties are (by definition!) not queer. By identifying moral with natural properties, the naturalist emerges embracing either natural facts with intrinsic prescriptivity, or moral facts without it. But natural facts with intrinsic prescriptivity are at least as queer as moral facts with intrinsic prescriptivity, and for the same reason. On the other hand, moral facts without intrinsic prescriptivity are, if anything, even more queer than moral facts with it.

Brink doesn’t accept the naturalist *identification* of moral properties with physical properties. Instead, he says that moral properties *supervene* upon physical properties. Mackie tried to deal with this possibility by attacking the purported relation between a natural fact (e.g. the fact that an act was a case of causing pain just for fun) and a moral fact (e.g. the fact that the act was wrong). It is, he says, not an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity, and yet the ‘wrongness must somehow be “consequential” or “supervenient”’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this “because”?’ (p. 41) Brink fails to answer this question. What he says is that a supervenient relation ‘obtains between two properties or sets of properties just in case the one property or set of properties is causally realised by the other property or set of properties.’<sup>17</sup> For materialists like Mackie and Brink, ‘all properties ultimately supervene on material or physical base properties’. So, Brink argues, if we accept the supervenience of biological, social, and psychological properties,

<sup>17</sup> Brink, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

there is no reason not to accept the supervenience of moral properties as well.<sup>18</sup>

This move mirrors the strategy used against the argument from disagreement, and is a favorite tool in the realist's bag of tricks. One simply finds companions in guilt (or as Brink suggests, in innocence). But this ignores the special respect in which moral properties are queer. Projected or not, redness is inert, but wrongness forbids. The objective prescriptivity instantly (with or without intrinsic motivational power) distinguishes moral from biological, social, or psychological properties, and makes the supervenience of moral properties especially problematic.

9. *Common sense and queerness*: Brink says that common sense doesn't support a belief in (motivational) internalism, since it is 'extremely unlikely that any belief so recherché could be part of common sense moral thinking'.<sup>19</sup> Motivational internalism is clearly not a part of common sense thinking, but common sense morality does involve a belief in objective prescriptivity. People believe that we are bound by moral considerations, that moral obligation is not optional, and that value is real rather than projected. R. M. Hare grants that many *philosophers* 'have thought that moral words connoted such objective, but at the same time prescriptive properties, and that the properties existed *in rerum natura* to make some of our moral judgments true', but he doesn't believe that 'ordinary people, innocent of any philosophy, are the whole time committing the same error'.<sup>20</sup> To be sure, ordinary people who manage to 'keep off philosophy' don't think or speak of their spontaneous moral intuitions as objective and prescriptive; nevertheless, beliefs that make no sense without the assumption of objective prescriptivity are common and entrenched. Ordinary people are so easily enticed into moral philosophy because the uses they make of morality require the very assumptions that the moral philosophers make explicit and debate.

10. *Taking the amoralist seriously*: In his article 'Externalist Moral Realism', Brink distinguishes between the moral skeptic, who is 'skeptical about the existence of moral facts', and the amoralist, 'who recognizes the existence of moral considerations and remains unmoved'.<sup>21</sup> One of the advantages Brink claims for externalist moral realism is that it permits us to take the amoralist's challenge seriously. 'Because externalism does not build motivational force into the concept of a moral consideration, it recognizes that we can imagine someone who recognizes moral considerations and remains unmoved'.<sup>22</sup>

One who 'recognizes moral considerations' must be understood to be one who is aware of the considerations people typically consider morally relevant, and who at the same time acknowledges the authority of morality, the

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>20</sup> R. M. Hare, *Moral Thinking* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 78-79.

<sup>21</sup> Brink 'Externalist Moral Realism', in *Spindel Conference 1985: Moral Realism* (ed. Norman Gillespie), Volume 24, Supplement, *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* (1985), p. 30.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

legitimacy of its requirements, perhaps even its objective prescriptivity. Now, someone like *this* who ‘remains unmoved’ may remain unmoved by morality, or by the considerations moralists call moral (for convenience let us call these considerations of ‘suffering’), or by both.

	Morality	Suffering
A	Moved	Unmoved
B	Unmoved	Moved
C	Unmoved	Unmoved

A is the Kantian *moralist* at his worst, moved by duty but not by suffering. Brink’s amoralist, by contrast, is either B or C. B is unmoved by the morality of the moral considerations, but not by the facts themselves, by the suffering. C, on the other hand, is unmoved by moral appeals and by suffering. Amoralists like B acknowledge the authority of morality but (defiantly?) insist upon doing the moral thing for their own non-moral reasons. Amoralists like C also acknowledge the authority of morality, and not only are they unmoved by their own moral beliefs, they lack other, non-moral, inclinations to do what morality requires. One way *not* to take amoralism seriously is to suppose that all amoralists will be like C, and that someone who does not care about moral considerations will behave immorally. Brink comes close to doing this when he mentions the sociopath as an example of someone ‘who does not care about moral considerations’,<sup>23</sup>

The *real* challenge to morality, however, comes from neither of Brink’s amoralists, both of whom *accept* morality and its authority, but from the individual Brink calls the moral skeptic, and I call the anti-realist. The question is not whether there are *intrinsically motivating* moral facts, it is whether there are *objectively obligating* ones. When we separate obligation from motivation, and focus on the genuine queerness of moral facts and properties, then externalist moral realism looks no more plausible than internalist moral realism. It is the *realism* that is the problem.

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.